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This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It
does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual
cells to Home sapiens, in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the
active inference scheme—a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov
blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we con-
sider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global
system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an illustration
of how autonomous systems can be understood as having layers of nested
and self-sustaining boundaries. This allows us to show that: (i) any living
system is a Markov blanketed system and (ii) the boundaries of such systems
need not be co-extensive with the biophysical boundaries of a living organ-
ism. In other words, autonomous systems are hierarchically composed of
Markov blankets of Markov blankets—all the way down to individual
cells, all the way up to you and me, and all the way out to include elements
of the local environment.1. Introduction
Organisms show a tendency to self-organize into a coherent whole despite them
comprising a multiplicity of nested systems. They also continuously work to
preserve their individual unity, thus tending to maintain a boundary that sep-
arates their internal states from their external milieu ([1]; see also [2]). These
tendencies speak to the autonomous organization of biological systems.
This paper addresses the self-organization of autonomous organization in
biological systems by asking how Markov blankets of living systems self-
organize via active inference—a corollary of the free energy principle. A
Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system (e.g. a cell or a multi-cellular
organism) in a statistical sense. It is a statistical partitioning of a system into
internal states and external states, where the blanket itself consists of the
states that separate the two. The states that constitute the Markov blanket can
be further partitioned into active and sensory states. Here, states stand in for
any variable that locates the system at a particular point in state space; for
example, the position and momentum of all the particles constituting a thermo-
dynamic system—right through to every detail of neuronal activity that might
describe the state of the brain. In the thermodynamic example, internal states
would correspond to the thermodynamic system (e.g. a gas) in question; the
external states would constitute a heat bath; and the Markov blanket could
be the states of a container that mediates (directed) exchange between the
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vous system, the active and sensory states correspond to
the states of all actuators or effectors and sensory organs,
respectively.
Statistically, the existence of a Markov blanket means
external states are conditionally independent of internal
states, and vice versa, as internal and external states can
only influence each other via sensory and active states. The
presence of the conditional independencies implied by a
Markov blanket induces—as shown in Friston [3]—active
inference. Active inference, in its simplest formulation,
describes the tendency of random dynamical systems to mini-
mize (on average) their free energy, where free energy is an
upper bound on (negative) marginal likelihood or evidence
(i.e. the probability of finding the system in a particular
state, given the system in question). This implies that the
kind of self-organization of Markov blankets we consider
results in processes that work entirely to optimize evidence,
namely self-evidencing dynamics underlying the auton-
omous organization of life, as we know it. In Bayesian
statistics, the evidence is known as ‘model’ evidence, where
we can associate the internal states with a model of the
external states.
We approach the self-organization of Markov blankets
and processes of model optimization that ensue in terms of
an optimality principle; namely, the minimization of free
energy [4]. Free energy was classically defined in terms of
thermodynamic principles, denoting a measure of energy
available to a system to do useful work (e.g. maintaining a
particular speed in a Watt governor or photosynthesis in
plants). The free energy we refer to here is an information-
theoretic analogue of the thermodynamic quantity. Free
energy is a bound on ‘surprisal’ (or negative model evidence)
or more simply ‘surprise’. The time average of surprise is
entropy (a measure of uncertainty), so the minimization of
free energy through time ensures that entropy is bounded.
One can understand surprisal as a measure of how unlikely
an observation would be by associating a system’s sensory
state with an observation or sensory sample [5]. Reducing
free energy is therefore the same as optimizing Bayesian
model evidence (negative surprisal) for a model (the
system) reflected in the probability distributions over sensory
data sampled by a system [6]. Crucially, this allows one to
explain self-assembly of Markov blankets in terms of approxi-
mate Bayesian inference and probabilistic beliefs that are
implicit in a system’s interactions with its local surroundings
[7]. This teleological (Bayesian) interpretation of dynamical
behaviour in terms of optimization allows us to think about
any system that possesses a Markov blanket as some rudi-
mentary (or possibly sophisticated) ‘agent’ that is
optimizing something; namely, the evidence for its own exist-
ence. This means we can regard the internal states (and their
Markov blanket) as, in some sense, autonomous.
In this paper, we take the internal and active states of a
Markov blanket to minimize free energy via active inference.
The scope of this formulation is extremely broad. It applies to
systems such as coupled pendulums that one would not
readily recognize as autonomous. This raises the question
of whether the Markov blanket formulation of biological sys-
tems is over-broad and thereby explanatorily empty with
respect to autonomy. We show that this worry can be
handled by formulating a novel distinction between ‘mere
active inference’ and ‘adaptive active inference’, as only thelatter enables modulation of an organism’s sensorimotor
coupling to its environment. From adaptive active inference
we argue that organisms comprise a multiplicity of Markov
blankets, the boundaries of which are neither fixed nor
stable. We do this by suggesting that an ensemble of
Markov blankets can self-organize into a global or macro-
scopic system that itself has a Markov blanket. This allows
us to provide an illustration of how autonomous systems
are realized by multiple self-evidencing and nested Markov
blankets. This construction implies that a living system is
composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets [8]—
reaching all the way down to cellular organelles and DNA
[9] and all the way out to elements of the environment [10].
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we introduce the
Markov blanket concept in the context of active inference
under the free energy principle. In §3 we distinguish between
mere active inference and adaptive active inference. It is
argued that only the latter kind of active inference enables
autonomous organization. In §4 we turn to develop the
notion of nested Markov blankets, i.e. Markov blankets of
Markov blankets.2. The Markov blanket and active inference
A Markov blanket constitutes (in a statistical sense) a bound-
ary that sets something apart from that which it is not. Hence,
it is a statistical partitioning of states into internal and
external states that are separated by a Markov blanket—
comprising active and sensory states. This shows that internal
and external states are conditionally independent, as they can
only influence one another via active and sensory states. For-
mally, a Markov blanket renders a set of states, internal and
external states, conditionally independent of one another.
That is, for any variable A, A is conditionally independent
of B, given another variable, C, if and only if the probability
of A and B given C can be written as p(AjC) and p(BjC ). In
other words, A is conditionally independent of B given C if,
when C is known, knowing A provides no further infor-
mation about B [11]. This maps on to the Markov blanket
shown in figure 1.
In this figure, the Markov blanket for node f5g is the
union of its parents f2,3g, the children of f5g, which are
f6,7g, and the parents’ children f4g. Hence, f5g ¼ f6,7g U
f2,3g U f4g ¼ f2,3,4,6,7g. The union of f5g does not include
f1g. This highlights that f1g and f5g are conditionally inde-
pendent given f2,3,4,6,7g. It also illustrates that, once the
union of f5g is given, the probability of f5g will not be
affected by the probability of f1g. Formally, f5g is con-
ditionally independent of f1g given f2,3,4,6,7g, if P(f5gjf1g,
f2,3,4,6,7g) ¼ P(f5gjf2,3,4,6,7g). This means that, once all
the neighbouring variables for f5g are known, knowing the
state of f1g provides no additional information about the
state of f5g. It is this kind of statistical neighbourhood for
f5g that is called a Markov blanket [12].
The cell is an intuitive example of a living system with a
Markov blanket. Without possessing a Markov blanket a cell
would no longer be, as there would be no way by which to
distinguish it from everything else. This is to say that, if the
Markov blanket of a cell deteriorates, there will be no evi-
dence for its existence, and it will cease to exist [13]. This
means that the identity of—or the evidence for—any given
biological system is conditioned on it having a Markov
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Figure 1. A schematic depiction of a Markov blanket with full conditionals.
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Markov blankets.
Biological systems have a capacity to maintain low-
entropy distributions over their internal states (and their
Markov blanket) despite living their lives in changing and
uncertain circumstances. This means that biological systems
can be cast as engaging in active inference, given that internal
and active states of a system with a Markov blanket can be
shown to maintain the structural and functional integrity of
such a system. To gain some intuition for the motivations
behind this formulation, consider that the independencies
established by a Markov blanket realize a co-dependence
between internal states and external states conditioned on
sensory and active states.
The partitioning rule governing Markov blankets illus-
trates that external states—which are ‘hidden’ behind the
Markov blanket—cause sensory states, which influence, but
are not themselves influenced by, internal states, while
internal states cause active states, which influence, but are
not themselves influenced by, external states [7]. Internal
and external states can therefore be understood as influencing
one another in a continuous and reciprocal fashion, given
dependencies between sensory and active states. The inde-
pendencies established by a Markov blanket are then
suggestive of an elemental form of active inference, where
internal and active states are directly involved in maintaining
the structural and functional integrity of the Markov blanket
[7]. This is because active inference rests on the assumption
that action—upon which perception depends—minimizes
uncertainty or surprise about the causes of an agent’s sensory
states [14]. Active inference therefore places an upper bound
on surprise, i.e. action drives an organism’s internal states
toward a free energy minima. We develop this point in the
remainder of this section.
Active inference is a cornerstone of the free energy prin-
ciple. This principle states that for organisms to maintain
their integrity they must minimize variational free energy.
Variational free energy bounds surprise because the former
can be shown to be either greater than or equal to the latter.
It follows that any organism that minimizes free energy
thereby reduces surprise—which is the same as saying that
such an organism maximizes evidence for its own model,
i.e. its own existence. In other words, self-evidencing behav-
iour is equivalent to statistical inference [11]. To see this,
consider, first,
Fðs, a, rÞ ¼  ln pðs, a jmÞ þDKL½qðwjrÞ k pðwjs, aÞ,
where s refers to sensory states, a to active states and r to
internal states. The notation F(s, a, r) denotes the variationalfree energy of internal states and their Markov blanket,
 ln pðs, ajmÞ refers to the negative log probability or
surprise conditioned on a generative model and
DKL ½qðwjrÞ k pðwjs, aÞ is the Kullback–Leibler (KL) diver-
gence between two probability densities: the variational
density, q(wjr), and the posterior density, p(wjs, a).
Crucially, this equality gives a Bayesian interpretation of
variational free energy. The negative log likelihood or prob-
ability is the same as surprise, while the KL divergence
measures the discrepancy between the variational density
and the true posterior. Minimizing free energy by changing
internal states can only reduce the divergence between beliefs
about external states (the variational density) and the true
posterior density given the states of the Markov blanket.
We can think of this as a form of perception. Minimizing
free energy by changing the active states can only change
the surprise or model evidence. This constitutes a form of
action that underwrites self-evidencing. We now consider
this in more detail.
This interpretation means that changing internal states is
equivalent to inferring the most probable, hidden causes of
sensory signals in terms of expectations about states of the
environment. Hidden causes are called hidden because they
can only be ‘seen’ indirectly by internal states through the
Markov blanket via sensory states. As an example, consider
that the most well-known method by which spiders catch
prey is via their self-woven, carefully placed and sticky
web. Common for web- or niche-constructing spiders is that
they are highly vibration sensitive. If we associate vibrations
with sensory observations, then it is only in an indirect sense
that one can meaningfully say that spiders have ‘access’ to the
hidden causes of their sensory world—i.e. to the world of
flies and other edible ‘critters’. It is in this sense that one
should understand a Markov blanket as establishing a stat-
istical boundary separating internal states from external
states. To then act on inferred states of the world means to
actively secure evidence that I am what I am; namely, a
critter-eating creature.
In a neurobiological setting, Markov blankets can be
‘found’ at each level of the brain’s hierarchy, which allows
us to associate the brain with a hierarchical Bayesian net-
work—one that is organized such that higher levels in the
cortical hierarchy infer (i.e. predict) the states at the level
below, all ‘the way down to the changing states of our sen-
sory receptors and physical actuators’ [15, p. 5]. It has
proved very helpful to think of exchanges between internal
and external states (across the Markov blanket) in terms of
a variational free energy-minimizing scheme called predictive
coding. In these formulations, free energy can be associated
with prediction errors; namely, the difference between sen-
sory states and their prediction is based upon internal
states. In predictive coding, predictions are made from the
‘top down’, while prediction error or local surprise is propa-
gated up the hierarchy until any residual error signal is
eliminated through updating or parametrizing Bayesian
beliefs. This, in turn, enables a system’s inferences to acquire
a ‘grip’ on the hidden causes of sensory input [16,17].
If we imagine the brain as a hierarchical or nested set of
Markov blankets, then the Markov blanket at any particular
level in the brain’s hierarchy must comprise active and sen-
sory states, where the active states influence lower levels
(i.e. external peripheral Markov blankets) and can be
regarded as predictions, while prediction errors play the
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internal Markov blankets). This coupled exchange of influ-
ences minimizes prediction errors at all levels of the
hierarchy; thereby constituting (an internalized) form of
active inference and implicit free energy minimization.
More generally, belief parametrization is captured by the
KL divergence above. This is a measure of the discrepancy
between current beliefs (the variational density) and the
true posterior distribution. Specifically, it is a measure of
the residual (or relative) surprise between the two probability
distributions. When the free energy is minimized, the vari-
ational density is approximately equal to the posterior
distribution. The better this approximation, the smaller the
divergence. This means that the variational density approxi-
mates exactly the same quantity that Bayesian inference
seeks to optimize. This is made clear through the following
expression of Bayes’ rule:
pðwjsÞ ¼ pðsjwÞpðwÞ
pðsÞ :
Bayes’ rule states that the (posterior) probability, p, of a
state, w, given some data (sensations), s, is equal to the prob-
ability of s given w multiplied by the prior probability of w,
divided by the prior probability of s. The relationship
between free energy minimization and Bayes’ rule demon-
strates that internal states and their Markov blanket can be
understood as engaging in approximate Bayesian infer-
ence—optimizing their (approximate) posterior beliefs over
a model as new sensations are experienced ([18]; for a critique
see [15]). This is the Bayesian brain hypothesis [4,19,20].
Active inference reminds us that it is not only internal
(e.g. neural) states that perform approximate Bayesian infer-
ence, but also active states. This embeds the view of the
brain as a Bayesian inference machine within the context of
embodied (active) inference, formularizing action as the pro-
cess of selectively sampling sensory data to minimize
surprise about their hidden causes ([21]; see also [16,22,23]).
To see this, consider that the relative entropy specified by
the KL divergence cannot be less than zero. The simplest
and most intuitive way by which to illustrate this is that the
KL divergence measures how different two distributions
are. This means that its minimum should be the point at
which the two distributions are equal, i.e. that the difference
between the two probability distributions is zero. Mathemat-
ically one can show that free energy is an upper bound on
surprise by considering the following inequality:
Fðs, a, rÞ   ln pðs, ajmÞ )
Et½Fðs, a, rÞ  Et½ ln pðs, ajmÞ ¼ H½pðs, ajmÞ:
This inequality states that variational free energy bounds
surprise, which follows from the fact that the KL divergence
cannot be less than zero, i.e. the smallest difference is zero
itself. This inequality can also be shown to follow from Jen-
sen’s inequality (see appendix A). Moreover, this implies
()): given that the expected (E) surprise averaged over
time is equal to Shannon entropy, H½pðs, ajmÞ, over internal
states and their Markov blanket given a generative model,
it follows that the expected variational free energy averaged
over time, Et½Fðs, a, rÞ, of internal states and their Markov
blanket is a bound on entropy. This inequality has several
non-trivial implications. We emphasize two below.First, any system that minimizes entropy by acting to
minimize uncertainty about the hidden causes of its sen-
sations must have a model of the kind of regularities it
expects to encounter in its environment. This means that,
over (phylogenetic and ontogenetic) time, an organism will
become a model of its environment (note that natural selec-
tion is a form of Bayesian model selection, which will
minimize free energy over an evolutionary time scale)—an
upshot that is entirely consistent with Conant & Ashby’s
[24] Good Regulator Theorem. In other words, it suggests
that regularities in the environment of an organism become
embodied in the organism—if the organism or species per-
sists. Under the free energy principle, this implies that
organisms are close to optimal models of their local sur-
roundings, i.e. their niche. Organisms become close to
optimal models by minimizing variational free energy,
which bounds the evidence for each phenotype or individual
model [25]. This does not imply that an agent must (some-
how) construct an internal model (i.e. representation) of its
outer environment. It simply means that an agent becomes
a statistical model of its niche in the sense of coming to
embody statistical regularities of its world in its physical
and functional composition.
Hence, one should recognize that the morphology, bio-
physical mechanics and neural architecture of the organism
all constitute an agent’s model, and that these parameters
(or parts) can be tuned and augmented by selection, learning
and experience [5]. Consequently, one should not confuse the
idea that organisms are models of their niche with the
additional view that organisms encode or represent their
niche in virtue of being a model. A simple example that illus-
trates this point is that it is possible to consider the
physiological make-up of a fish, say, as a model of the fluid
dynamics and other elements that constitute its aquatic
environment—its internal dynamics depends on the
dynamics of the niche [26]. It is in this embodied sense that
one should understand the claim that an organism is a
model. In other words, an organism does not merely have
a model of its world; rather, it is a model. The model is
therefore the entire phenotype [3,21–23,27].
Second, active inference implies that agents are partly
responsible for generating the sensory evidence that they
garner for themselves. Active inference thus captures the
idea that Clark [28], following Lungarella & Sporns [29],
calls information self-structuring. Information self-structuring
highlights the important idea that:[T]he agent’s control architecture (e.g. nervous system) attends to
and processes streams of sensory stimulation, and ultimately
generates sequences of motor actions which in turn guide the
further production and selection of sensory information. [In
this way] ‘information structuring’ by motor activity and ‘infor-
mation processing’ by the neural system are continuously
linked to each other through sensorimotor loops. ([29, p. 25];
quoted in [28, p. 18])We understand this to imply that an agent is able to minimize
free energy, and therefore surprise, by actively sampling and
changing the hidden causes of its environment. This means
that biological systems have expectations and make infer-
ences about the causal regularities and make-up of the
environment in which they are situated [30]. In short, given
enough time, agents will come to be the authors of the
external states (i.e. environments) that reciprocate with
Figure 2. Two oscillating (i.e. coupled random dynamical) systems, A and B,
suspended from a beam that is itself able to move. The two arrows illustrate
the coupling between pendulum A and pendulum B (for additional discussion,
see [16]).
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the right sort to sustain cycles of self-evidencing.3. The Markov blanket and adaptive active
inference
All Markov blanketed systems can be associated with active
inference. In this paper, we wish to not only develop this
idea but also analyse what properties a Markov blanketed
system must instantiate for it to be autonomous. It is tempt-
ing to think that if a system has a Markov blanket—which
induces an elemental form of active inference—then that
system is by definition an autonomous system. We want to
suggest that it be unwise to yield to such a temptation.
3.1. The Markov blanket—mere active inference
Any Markov blanketed system can be shown to engage in
active inference in virtue of its separation of internal and
external states (via sensory and active states). Here we con-
sider a very simple example of two coupled random
dynamical systems, exemplified by a set of coupled Huygens’
pendulums (figure 2).
The beam functions as a Markov blanket. This means that
the motions of the two pendulums are statistically indepen-
dent of one another conditioned on the motion of the
beam. If one were to suspend motion of the beam there
would be no synchronization between the pendulums. Thus
the two pendulums would cease to be dynamically coupled.
Furthermore, each pendulum can be understood as a genera-
tive model of the other, where the probabilistic mapping from
hidden causes (the dynamics of the black clock) to sensory
observations (for the grey clock) is mediated by the beam,
i.e. the Markov blanket states of the clocks. Note that we
are using the terms ‘sensory’ and ‘active’ states in an extre-
mely broad sense, associating active states with position
and sensory states with velocity or motion.1 This allows us
to minimally describe the clocks as engaging in active infer-
ence, although of a fairly simple form. We call this mere
active inference.
What warrants this claim is that it is possible to cast gen-
eralized synchrony between two coupled pendulums in
terms of mutual information. In information theory, mutualinformation is the KL divergence between the marginal den-
sities over two sets of variables and the joint distribution.
When the two sets of variables are independent, the joint dis-
tribution becomes the product of the marginals and the KL
divergence or mutual information falls to zero. In virtue of
the fact that the states of our pendulums have high mutual
information they are effectively obliged to actively infer
each other; such that, given the (internal) states of one pendu-
lum, one could infer the (internal) states of the other, which,
of course, are the external states of the first. It is in this sense
that one can conceive of the two pendulums as engaging in
active (Bayesian) inference.3.2. The Markov blanket—adaptive active inference
The dynamics of Huygens’ pendulums exemplifies a Markov
chain over time. A Markov chain is a special case of a Markov
blanket, in which the dependencies among states are
restricted to a chain of successive influences with no recipro-
cal influences or loops. This means that the core properties of
a Markov chain do not generalize to all Markov blankets, e.g.
the conditional independencies induced by a Markov chain
are unidirectional. When applied to successive states over
time, Markov chains capture the notion that events are con-
ditionally independent of previous or past events given the
current states of the system [12]. Systems with unidirectional
conditional independencies are non-autonomous. The reason
is that such systems cannot modulate their relation to the
world, since a Markov chained system is entirely ‘enslaved’
by its here-and-now—and, in particular, its precedents.
This is not true of biological systems. Biological systems
are homeostatic systems that exhibit (or perhaps create)
dependencies over multiple time scales. Accordingly, biologi-
cal systems are able to actively monitor and react to
perturbations that challenge homeostatic variables, which
may, from time to time, go out of bounds. This means that
a biological system must possess a generative model with
temporal depth, which, in turn, implies that it can sample
among different options and select the option that has the
greatest (expected) evidence or least (expected) free energy.
The options sampled from are intuitively probabilistic and
future oriented. Hence, living systems are able to ‘free’ them-
selves from their proximal conditions by making inferences
about probabilistic future states and acting so as to minimize
the expected surprise (i.e. uncertainty) associated with those
possible future states. This capacity connects biological qua
homeostatic systems with autonomy, as the latter denotes
an organism’s capacity to regulate its internal milieu in the
face of an ever-changing environment. This means that if a
system is autonomous it must also be adaptive, where adap-
tivity refers to an ability to operate differentially in certain
circumstances. Were the system not able to do this it would
cease to exist [26,31].
The key difference between mere and adaptive active
inference rests upon selecting among different actions based
upon deep (temporal) generative models that minimize the
free energy expected under different courses of action. This
is fundamentally different from the generalized synchrony
and mere active inference seen in Huygens’ pendulums. Ima-
gine that the pendulums could jump around and attach
themselves to different beams. In this setting what would
happen under adaptive active inference? In fact, the pendu-
lums would aspire to generalized synchrony (i.e. mere
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ments belied more distal external states (i.e. other
pendulums). This reflects the epistemic behaviour that fol-
lows from minimizing uncertainty about ‘what’s out there’.
Clearly, an active pendulum must have a generative model
that includes other pendulums suspended from beams. A
more heuristic example here would be our tendency to
sample salient information that resolves uncertainty about
states of the world ‘out there’, e.g. looking for a frown or
smile on a person’s face. The key point being made here is
that there is an autonomy afforded by systems whose active
states depend on internal states that parametrize (predictive
posterior) beliefs about the consequences of action.
The resulting existential foraging speaks directly to the
framework of autopoietic enactivism in naturalist philosophy
of mind [22,31–34]. Central to this framework are notions
such as operational closure and sense making.
Operational closure refers to a process of autopoietic self-
assembly and self-maintenance separating the internal states
of an organism from its external states, providing an organ-
ism with an identity. Varela et al. [35] highlight this by
saying that:A cell stands out of a molecular soup by creating the boundaries
that set it apart from that which it is not. Metabolic processes
within the cell determine these boundaries. In this way the cell
emerges as a figure out of a chemical background. Should this
process of self-production be interrupted, the cellular com-
ponents . . . gradually diffuse back into a molecular soup. [35,
p. 44]The very existence of living systems can therefore be con-
strued as a process of boundary conservation, where the
boundary of a system is its Markov blanket [8]. This means
that the dependencies induced by the presence of a Markov
blanket are what keep the system far removed from thermo-
dynamical equilibrium (not to be confused with dynamic
equilibrium). In other words, it is the dependencies among
states that establish a kinetic barrier, which, in turn, constitu-
tes the system’s parts and maintains an energy gradient. The
operational closure of any living system speaks directly to the
partitioning rule governing Markov blankets; namely that
external states may influence internal states even if the
former are not constitutive parts of an operationally closed
system. Di Paolo [31] makes this explicit, when he says:[T]here may be processes that are influenced by constituent pro-
cesses but do not themselves condition any of them and are
therefore not part of the operationally-closed network. In their
mutual dependence, the network of processes closes upon itself
and defines a unity that regenerates itself. [31, pp. 15–16]Thus, any Markov blanketed system will embody recurrent
processes of autopoietic self-generation, which—as long as
the system exists—enforces a difference between a living
system and everything else [33]. This means that these pro-
cesses are fundamentally processes of identity constitution,
given that they result in a functionally coherent unit [36].
Casting operational closure in terms of the presence of a
Markov blanket gives the notion of operational closure a stat-
istical formulation. One of the nice things about casting
operational closure in terms of the presence of a Markov blan-
ket is that it allows us to explain what Varela [36] called ‘the
intriguing paradox’ of an autonomous identity: how a living
system must both distinguish itself from its environment and,
at the same time, maintain its energetic coupling to its
environment to remain alive. According to Varela: ‘thislinkage cannot be detached since it is against this very
environment from which the organism arises, comes forth’
[36, p. 78].
The answer to this apparent paradox lies in the con-
ditional independencies induced by the presence of a
Markov blanket, which (as we know) separates internal
states and external states, and can be further decomposed
into active states and internal states. Crucially, active and sen-
sory states are distinguished in the following sense: active
states influence but cannot be influenced by external states,
while sensory states influence but cannot be influenced by
internal states. This constraint enforces conditional indepen-
dence between internal and external states—from which an
autonomous identity can be shown to emerge—while creat-
ing a coupling between organism and environment via
sensory and active states.
Sense making refers to an organism’s possession of oper-
ationally closed mechanisms that can ‘potentially distinguish
the different virtual (i.e. probabilistic) implications of other-
wise equally viable paths of encounters with the
environment’ [31, p. 15]. Sense making can therefore be
associated with what we call adaptive active inference—the
idea that living organisms can actively change their relation
to their environment. This suggests that living systems can
transcend their immediate present state and work towards
occupying states with a free energy minimum. This speaks
to the main difference between mere active inference and
adaptive active inference. Any organism that must adapt to
the changing dynamics of its environment must be able to
infer the sensorimotor consequences of its own actions. It
cannot do so without possessing a generative model of its
future states dependent on how its acts. This is what adaptive
active inference is: the capacity to infer the results of future
actions given a history of previous engagement with the
world, harnessed in the prior probabilities reflected in the
generative model [37]. Adaptive active inference is therefore
inherently associated with hierarchical generative models.
Hierarchical generative models comprise nested and multi-
layered Markov blankets [38]. The nested structure of such
a Markov blanketed system is what induces the multilayered
independencies required for a system to realize generative
models with temporal and spatial depth, enabling the
system to make inference over recursively larger and larger
scales of sensorimotor consequences.
Intuitively, to remain alive an organism must avoid cross-
ing terminal species-specific phase boundaries. An example
of a phase boundary that makes this clear is the bank of a
river. On one side of this boundary, an organism will retain
its structural integrity. On the other side, it will not (unless
it is amphibious). Being near a riverbank thus presents such
an organism with at least two probabilistic outcomes relative
to how it might act. It can move in such a way that it falls over
the side of the riverbank. Or it can move to remain at some
distance to the riverbank. This means that an organism
must have prior probabilistic beliefs about (the consequences
of) its behaviour, which, in turn, implies that it must be able
to sample across different probabilistic outcomes of its own
actions. Such an organism instantiates a hierarchically
nested generative model consisting of a multiplicity of
Markov blankets, the parameters of which are sculpted and
maintained during adaptive active inference.
What distinguishes autonomous systems from those lack-
ing autonomy (at least as we have defined autonomy here) is
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time [37]. This sheds light on the kind of architectural prop-
erties an autonomous system must have for it to
successfully restrict itself to a limited number of attracting
states. The first observation is that action depends on infer-
ence. This means that an organism must be able to make
inferences about the outcomes of its own actions. The
second observation is that for any organism to make infer-
ences of this kind it must have a generative model of future
states. We made this point earlier by stating that an organism
must be able to infer the probabilistic outcomes of its own
actions. For example, an organism needs to assess what
might happen were it to jump into a fast flowing river.
Note that such a creature cannot access sensory observations
of such outcomes, until it undertakes one action, at the
expense of others. This means that systems able to make
such future-oriented inferences must possess a generative
model with temporal or counterfactual depth [26,39]. A
system with a temporally deep generative model will be a
system capable of acting (i.e. inferring) ahead of actuality.
The deeper the temporal structure of a living system’s genera-
tive model, the better it will be at sampling across the
probabilistic outcomes of its own actions—and the better it
will be at entertaining a repertoire of possible actions.3.3. Summary
In summary, active inference is all about maintaining your
Markov blanket—a game that can be cast in terms of active
inference, under a model of the world that generates sensory
impressions or states. This model becomes equipped with
prior beliefs that shape action on the world. Generally speak-
ing, active inference assumes that the only self-consistent
prior is that the actions undertaken by organisms minimize
expected free energy. Or, put differently, organisms will act
to minimize expected surprise and thereby resolve uncer-
tainty by actively sampling their environments [14]. There
are several intuitive behaviours that emerge under this treat-
ment, which we can illustrate with the riverbank example.
Imagine a creature confronted with a riverbank: in the
absence of any prior beliefs about what it would be like to
be in the water, the river holds an epistemic affordance (i.e.
novelty), in the sense that entering the water resolves uncer-
tainty about ‘what would happen if I did that’. If the
unfortunate creature subsequently drowned, priors would
emerge (with a bit of natural selection) in her conspecifics
that water is not a natural habitat. A few generations down
the line, the creature, when confronted with a riverbank,
will maintain a safe distance in virtue of avoiding expected
surprise, i.e. fulfilling the prior belief that ‘creatures like me
are not found in water.’
Hence, if a creature cannot swim it becomes imperative to
keep away from the banks of the river. This, in turn, implies
that its imperative for action selection must be guided by
priors stating that whichever action is selected it must be
one that minimizes expected surprise. Survival is therefore
premised on having a generative model with a particular
temporal thickness, underpinning the ergodic property of
life (e.g. from now until swimming—or not). Ergodicity
implies that the proportion of time an organism is in some
state (e.g. on land rather than falling into a river) is the
same as the probability of that organism being in thatstate—assuming that the fewer states the organism visits
during its lifetime, the lower its average entropy.
On this view, the ultimate endgame is—perhaps counter-
intuitively—to become a Huygens’ pendulum. In other
words, to engineer a world of predictability, harmony and
(generalized) synchrony, in which there is no uncertainty
about what to do—or what will happen. This aspiration of
adaptive active inference (namely, mere active inference) is
famously exemplified by the sea squirt that ‘eats its own
brain’ after it has attached itself to the right ‘beam’. One
might ask why Homo sapiens have failed to reach this existen-
tial Nirvana. This is probably due to the fact that the world
we populate contains other systems (like ourselves) that con-
found predictions—in virtue of the deep generative models
that lie underneath their Markov blankets. In what follows,
we now consider in greater depth the relationships among
Markov blankets that endow the world with structure.4. Ensemble Markov blankets: blankets of
blankets (of blankets)
In this section, we consider how a collective of Markov blan-
kets can assemble or self-organize into an ensemble that itself
has a Markov blanket. Crucially, this allows us to argue for
the possibility of two things: namely, that an autonomous
system is an operationally closed system with the property
of adaptivity, and that this organization is best characterized
in terms of Markov blankets of Markov blankets, i.e. ensem-
ble Markov blankets. Active inference can therefore make
sense of complex living systems whose autonomy can be
described at multiple levels of organization.2
One of the key characteristics of all living systems is their
hierarchical nature. This means that a non-trivial property of
life is its propensity to form multi-level and multi-scale struc-
tures of structures [30]. Crucially, each of these systems
makes up a larger whole with respect to its parts, while, at
the same time, being a part of an even larger whole, and so
on. Cells assemble to form tissues, tissues combine to form
organs, and organs organize into organisms. These nested,
multi-layered systems are, in turn, embedded within even
larger social systems and ecosystems. Indeed, over the
entire living world, we find living systems organized into
even larger living systems [1]. This view of systems
embedded within systems lies at the heart of systems think-
ing in biology [40,41] and neuroscience [42,43], and has its
developmental roots in synergetics [44] and thermodynamics
[45].
Any one of these systems has its unique Markov blanket.
This means that life comprises Markov blankets of Markov
blankets—all the way down to cellular organelles and mol-
ecules like DNA, and all the way up to organisms and their
environments, both ecological and social (figure 3).
A compelling reason for making this claim is that it
allows us to describe systems at multiple different levels.
That individuals can be distinguished from one another
implies that each system has a Markov blanket—e.g. that
the organs within an organism can be distinguished implies
that they exist. Note that the upshot of this line of thinking
is that an autonomous system (any system able to remain far
removed from its terminal phase boundaries) has a Markov
blanket at its superordinate level composed of Markov blan-
kets at its supraordinate level. The self-evidencing dynamics
blankets all the way down
protozoa
Markov blanket
I model the world
we model the world
we model ourselves modelling the world
blanket of blankets
blankets within blankets
plants
pontiffs
Figure 3. Nested Markov blankets of Markov blankets at different levels of organization.
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two different yet complementary tendencies: an integrative
tendency of a multiplicity of Markov blankets to self-organize
into a coherent self-evidencing whole, and a self-assertive ten-
dency to preserve individual autonomy. This is the basis for
the claim that autonomous systems are made up of Markov
blankets of Markov blankets.
Central to the idea of an ensemble Markov blanket is that
the statistical form and subsequent partitioning rule govern-
ing Markov blankets allow for the formation of Markov
blankets at larger and larger scales (of cells, of organs, of indi-
viduals, of local environments). The reason for this is that the
organization of Markov blankets occurs recursively at larger
and larger scales, recapitulating the statistical form of
Markov blankets at smaller microscopic scales (figure 3).
Figure 4 depicts a system constituted by a multiplicity of
nested Markov blankets at the scale of microscopic dynamics,
and a larger or bigger Markov blanket at the macroscopic
scale of collective dynamics. It thus becomes possible to dis-
tinguish between internal and external states only by appeal
to the presence of a third set of states; namely, the Markov
blanket. This means that the assembly of Markov blankets
can be understood to occur in a nested and hierarchical
fashion, where a Markov blanket and its internal states at
the macroscopic scale consist of smaller Markov blankets
and their internal states at microscopic scales of systemic
operations. Crucially, the conservation of Markov blankets
(of Markov blankets) at every hierarchical scale enables the
dynamics of the states at one scale to enslave the (states of)
Markov blankets at the scale below, thereby ensuring that
the organization as a whole is involved in the minimization
of variational free energy. It is thus only when the properties
of the collective dynamics feed back into the scale below,
forming a free energy-minimizing system at the scale of the
whole system, that it is possible to talk meaningfully of
ensemble Markov blankets—blankets whose self-evidencing
dynamics result in an overall self-sustaining organization.
We can explain the nested Markov blanket organization
of living systems further by appeal to basic principles of com-
plexity theory. The first is that the existence of asuperordinate Markov blanket organization, which is inti-
mately connected to the idea of an order parameter in
complexity theory [47]. An order parameter is a macroscopic
(global or systemic) feature of a system, and captures the
coherency (i.e. dependencies) among the parts making it
up. In this context, the statistical form of each constituent
means that each part infers that it is an internal state of a
larger Markov blanket, which, in turn, allows each internal
state to influence and be influenced by all other internal
states. This process of self-assembling Markov blankets of
Markov blankets must thus be understood as reconfiguring
the particular dependencies between internal, external,
active and sensory states. The second is that this kind of
self-assembling activity implies a separation of the dynamics
involved into slow and fast time scales—a signature feature of
the slaving principle in synergetics [48]. As a result it
becomes possible to understand that slow ensemble
dynamics arise from microscale dynamics unfolding over
fast time scales. But notice that since the ensemble Markov
blanket plays the role of an order parameter it follows that
all the dynamics at the microscale no longer behave indepen-
dently but ‘are sucked into an ordered coordinated pattern’
[49, p. 8]. The dynamics at the microscale are therefore con-
strained by the dynamics at the macroscale. A famous
example of this is the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction in
chemistry; however, there are many other examples in the lit-
erature on complex systems and self-organization (see, for
example, [47,49–54]). Any autonomous agent will therefore
be made up of many Markov blankets, the dynamics of
which unfolds on different temporal and spatial scales.
In some cases, it will be correct to identify the boundaries
of an autonomous organization with the biophysical bound-
aries of a single individual. The cell is an obvious case.
Its intracellular web of networks is separated from its extra-
cellular environment by a Markov blanket. However, the
organization of Markov blankets of Markov blankets can
also extend in an outward direction. In such circumstances,
it is more appropriate to conceive of the realizers of Markov
blanketed systems as including extra-individual features of
an organism’s local environment.
Figure 4. Markov blankets of Markov blankets. This illustrates how the conditional dependency structure of Markov blankets can be replicated at larger spatial scales.
Internal (red) states are separated from external (blue) states via sensory (yellow) states and active (orange) states at different scales of organization [46].
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system, the internal states of which comprise environmental
aspects [31]. The water boatman is ‘able to breathe under-
water by trapping air bubbles (plastrons) using tiny hairs
in the abdomen. The bubbles even refill with oxygen due to
the differences in partial pressure provoked by respiration
and potentially can work indefinitely. They provide access
to longer periods underwater thanks to a mediated regulation
of environmental coupling (which is nevertheless potentially
riskier than normal breathing)’ [31, p. 17]. This example high-
lights the fact that some creatures incorporate elements of their
niche that jointly contribute to—or preserve—their structural
integrity over time. Hence, the bubbles in which the boatman
is wrapped are best conceived of as elements constituting the
boatman’s Markov blanket. This follows because without the
bubbles the water boatman would not be able to minimize
variational free energy. It is in this sense that the water boat-
man plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov
blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to
include parts of the environment.
Markov blankets of autonomous systems are not merely
capable of extending outwards. The boundaries can also be
shown to be malleable. This is the case with Clark’s [9]
example of the caterpillar-cum-butterfly. Most caterpillars
will spend part of their lives on their food source, devouring
it. Over the course of their lifespan, caterpillars move away
from their preferred source of food. They do this to find shel-
ter—a place in which to pupate, the process that transforms
them into adulthood. In all caterpillars pupation occurs
inside a protective shell known as a chrysalis, which is
assembled by the caterpillar literally shedding its skin. It is
this self-made shell that protects the caterpillar while it
morphs into a butterfly. Fascinatingly, during this phase tran-
sition most of the caterpillar’s body breaks down to a mass of
undifferentiated cells—like a primordial soup out of which
cells begin to set themselves apart and self-organize into anew phenotypic form. When the transformation is com-
plete—a process known as holometabolism—the caterpillar
turned pupa emerges in the form of a butterfly. From a cer-
tain point of view, these phase transitions may look as if
the organism is unable to maximize evidence for its own
autonomy—for its own existence. Yet, as Clark (convincingly,
in our view) argues, ‘the act of transformation is itself an
essential part of the on-going project of exchanging entropy
with the environment so as to persist in the face of the
second law [of thermodynamics]’ [9, p. 12]. This means that
the succession of differently Markov blanketed organizations
is itself a free energy-minimizing strategy—one that occurs
over the entire life cycle from caterpillar to butterfly. As
Clark puts it: ‘The life-cycle is self-evidencing insofar as the
very existence of the linked stages (caterpillar, pupa, butter-
fly) provides evidence for the “model” that is the
metamorphic agent, where that agent is not identified with
a specific morphology (which would correspond merely to
one state of the life cycle) but with the temporally extended
whole’ [9, p. 12].
These examples both show that the organizational bound-
aries of living systems are open and flexible in the precise
sense that such boundaries need not be co-extensive with
an organism’s bodily boundaries.5. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the autonomous organiz-
ation of living systems consists of the hierarchical assembly
of Markov blankets of Markov blankets through adaptive
active inference. We have further argued that this nested
Markov blanketed organization need not be co-extensive
with the biophysical boundaries of the organism but may
extend to include aspects of an organism’s environment.
We have not established (i.e. shown) that the self-
log x
log x2
log x1
x1 x2
x
x1 + x2
2
x1 + x2
2
log
Figure 5. Illustration of Jensen’s inequality used to show that the free energy
is an upper bound on surprise.
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Markov blankets is an emergent property of systems (under
the right sorts of conditions). Our focus in this paper has
been on the implications of such an emergent structure.
Having said this, in a parallel (formal) programme of work,
we have used simulations to provide a proof of principle
that this particular (and possible ubiquitous) form of self-
organization is an emergent property. The simulations we
use in this parallel work build on previous work that charac-
terizes the emergence of pattern formation and
morphogenesis in a biological system [7] but with an impor-
tant twist. Instead of simulating the assembly of Markov
blankets systems from the bottom up, we apply a top-down
approach (see Palacios et al. [46] for details).
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Endnotes
1This speaks to a subtle argument that, briefly, goes as follows. The
position states of one Markov blanket can only influence the velocity
states of another (through forces). This ensures that position (i.e.
action) states of one blanket cannot be directly influenced by velocity
(i.e. sensory) states of another blanket (i.e. external states).
2A slightly more technical motivation for Markov blankets of Markov
blankets follows from the notion of states. We predicated our argu-
ment on the ensemble dynamics of states to show that things are
only defined in terms of their Markov blankets. It therefore follows
that the states of things are states of Markov blankets. From this it fol-
lows that Markov blankets of states must entail Markov blankets of
(the states of) Markov blankets.
Appendix A
The curve of a logarithmic function is concave. This has an
important implication when averages are taken either of thelogarithmic function or of the input to the function. To gain
some intuition for this, consider a dataset of just two points,
x1 and x2. The average of these will lie halfway between the
two, as shown on the x-axis in figure 5. When the logar-
ithms of x1, x2 and their average are calculated (y-axis), it
is clear that the log of the average lies above the midpoint
between logx1 and logx2. The midpoint is the average of
the logarithms, so this implies that the log of an average is
greater than the average of a log. This is a statement of Jensen’s
inequality.
If we replace the variable x with a ratio of probabilities,
Pðo, sÞ=QðssÞ, and take averages (‘expectations’) with respect
to a distribution Q(s), we can use Jensen’s inequality to write:
EQ(s) ln
Pðo, sÞ
QðsÞ
 
 lnEQ(s) Pðo, sÞQðsÞ
 
:
The term on the left (the average of the log) is the negative
free energy. The term on the right is the negative surprise. To
see this, if we write the expectation out in full, we have
EQ(s)
Pðo, sÞ
QðsÞ
 
¼
X
s
QðsÞPðo, sÞ
QðsÞ ¼
X
s
Pðo, sÞ ¼ PðoÞ:
These allow us to rewrite the inequality (noting that,
when we make both sides negative, the inequality sign
reverses),
F   lnPðoÞ:
This is the statement that the free energy is an upper
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